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 US-ROK-Japan Extended Deterrence Trilateral Dialogue 
 
The Pacific Forum CSIS, with the ASAN Institute for Policy Studies, and with 
support from the Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering WMD 
(PASCC) and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), held a US-ROK-Japan 
Extended Deterrence Trilateral Dialogue on Sept. 2-3, 2013. Some 35 US, ROK, and 
Japanese experts, officials, military officers, and observers, along with 15 Pacific Forum 
Young Leaders attended, all in their private capacities. Key findings include: 
A changed and changing regional security environment has created new problems 
for extended deterrence and assurance. As North Korea becomes capable of striking the 
US homeland, some South Koreans raised concern that North Korea might conclude that 
Washington would be reluctant to defend them in a conflict. Other participants worried 
that North Korea will think that its improved nuclear forces provide cover to be more 
aggressive or overconfident at the conventional level China’s nuclear and conventional 
force modernization (and its growing assertiveness on territorial and maritime issues) are 
also increasingly worrisome, 
South Koreans and Japanese stress the essential role of US nuclear weapons for 
extended deterrence and assurance missions; some South Koreans expressed concern 
over the US policy to reduce the roles and numbers of nuclear weapons. South Koreans 
expressed skepticism about ballistic missile defense and conventional strike options for 
deterrence purposes and argued that emphasizing such efforts could undermine extended 
deterrence. Americans stressed that the conventional and nuclear components of extended 
deterrence are mutually reinforcing, not mutually exclusive.  
South Koreans and Japanese want clarity on US nuclear doctrine. If nuclear 
weapons would only be used in ‘extreme cases,’ some asked for details about what 
constitutes an extreme case. 
Both allies recognize they must strengthen their defense postures to respond to 
challenges that fall below the extended deterrence threshold and emphasized the value of 
deterrence by early detection.  
South Korean and Japanese governments seek expanded indigenous capabilities 
to increase their deterrent capability and as contributions to the alliance. South Korea 
concluded an agreement with the US to extend missile ranges and Japan is considering 
strike options. Each sees its own actions as positive and the others as potentially 
troublesome. 
While no decisions have been made about Tokyo’s pursuit of offensive strike 
options, Japanese emphasized that uch capabilities would not be used for pre-emption but 
for retaliation; this did not reflect concern about the credibility of extended deterrence 
but, rather, concern that the North may be overconfident in its capabilities. Japanese also 
noted that the correct English translation of offensive strike does not imply preemption.  
South Koreans worry about Japan’s acquisition of strike capabilities, arguing that 
the ROK constitution defines all the Korean Peninsula as ROK territory and that a strike 
against the DPRK would be a strike against the ROK. While this is a legal fiction, it 
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demonstrates the sensitivity surrounding Japanese interest in offensive capabilities. 
Japanese understand Seoul’s push for the revision of its missile guidelines, but argued 
that this was completed in a non-transparent manner. 
Japanese called for greater transparency in US-ROK alliance talks, referencing 
the OpCon transfer in particular, to assuage concerns about what was happening, why, 
and the implications of the process. The US-Japan alliance and the UNC rear are key to 
Korean Peninsula defense and Tokyo should be better informed of US-ROK alliance 
developments. 
The crisis in Syria was referenced as a test of US credibility: “red lines should not 
be drawn unless you intend to enforce them”; not doing so would damage US credibility 
among allies and adversaries. The difficulties faced by the administration to garner 
domestic support for the use of force against Syria prompted concerns about the US 
ability to react quickly to a contingency in Northeast Asia. 
It is not clear what situations become tests of US credibility and commitment, and 
why. The tendency to see every challenge as such a threat must be resisted. More work 
must be done to identify what makes some challenges more critical than others.  
While South Koreans are the most reluctant of the three countries to publicly 
identify China as a potential threat, most are clear-eyed about the challenges posed by 
China’s growing strength. They readily acknowledge that some foreign policy decisions 
(including those related to missile defense) reflect concern about Korean vulnerability to 
Chinese pressure. Japanese are most vocal about a potential Chinese threat, in view of the 
current row over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. They stressed that the United States should 
not acknowledge mutual vulnerability with China. Doing so, they fear, could embolden 
Chinese regional assertiveness. 
Americans, South Koreans, and Japanese see opportunities for trilateral 
cooperation, namely in the form of joint exercises, to deal with the DPRK. However, 
acknowledging that ‘publics’ shape policy and could derail such cooperation, participants 
were divided on whether this process should receive high-level attention or develop at the 
operational level. All agree that high-level support is essential to permit cooperation to 
proceed; the question is whether to highlight lower-level successes. 
Tensions in the overall Korea-Japan relationship inhibit greater defense 
cooperation, even when such cooperation is seen as contributing to both sides’ national 
security.  
South Koreans explained that the current debate over reintroducing US tactical 
nuclear weapons on the Peninsula and/or developing an independent South Korea nuclear 
capability is in part driven by a lack of other options to bring pressure on Beijing to 
constrain Pyongyang, arguing that this quest is not reflective of a lack of confidence in 
the US extended deterrent. 
Americans insisted that reintroduction of tactical nuclear weapons and/or 
development by Seoul of nuclear weapons runs contrary to US policy, which seeks to 
reduce nuclear weapons in the world, and would serve to justify rather than delegitimize 
the DPRK’s nuclear policy. 
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Both US allies argued that US consistency is critical to reassurance and warned 
that change in US policy if/once North Korea develops a long-range nuclear capability 
would undermine US credibility.  
While US commitments to force level benchmarks are helpful, South Koreans and 
Japanese participants said that force readiness was important than numbers. 
Efforts by Seoul and Tokyo to develop expanded missile capabilities may 
influence Russian thinking. This could impact the debate over the consolidation of US 
and Russian tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. More attention needs to be paid on how 
developments in one region may impact on another. 
Americans, South Koreans, and Japanese all acknowledged the value of this 
dialogue in promoting trilateral cooperation on extended deterrence and assurance. The 
Japanese in particular saw this dialogue as critical in helping promote understanding of 
Japan’s positions in Korea. With the right people, this process can produce positive 






Building Toward Trilateral Cooperation on 
Extended Deterrence in Northeast Asia 
 
A Conference Report by 
David Santoro and Brad Glosserman 
  
North Korea's rapid nuclear and missile developments and China's steady force 
modernization are creating new security challenges for Northeast Asian stability. These 
challenges have important implications for US extended deterrence, which Washington 
has long provided to the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan. Taking stock of these new 
challenges, the United States has strengthened its extended deterrence relationships with 
both its allies by adapting its force posture and policy and by establishing bilateral 
consultative mechanisms that meet on a regular basis to provide alliance solutions to 
these problems: the US-ROK Extended Deterrence Policy Committee and the US-Japan 
Extended Deterrence Dialogue. While progress has been made, much remains to be done 
in both bilateral alliances. At the same time, at least from a US perspective, stronger 
cooperation on extended deterrence and assurance at the trilateral level would further 
strengthen regional stability. 
 
To shed light on ways to enhance US-ROK-Japan trilateral cooperation on 
extended deterrence and to prod the three countries toward this end, the Pacific Forum 
CSIS, with the ASAN Institute for Policy Studies, with support from the Naval 
Postgraduate School's Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering 
Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, held a US-
ROK-Japan Extended Deterrence Trilateral Dialogue in Seoul, South Korea on Sept. 2-3, 
2013. Thirty-five US, Korean, and Japanese experts and officials, along with 15 Pacific 
Forum CSIS Young Leaders from the three countries attended, all in their private 
capacities. They examined and compared perspectives on extended deterrence and 
assurance, China and the balance of power in Asia, North Korea, and changes in national 
defense postures in the United States, the ROK, and Japan. Participants also explored 
opportunities and challenges to strengthen trilateral cooperation on extended deterrence 
and assurance.   
 
Strategic Perspectives and Extended Deterrence 
 
Our Korean speaker opened this session by stressing that North Korea’s nuclear 
development and willingness to engage in military provocations meant that business as 
usual was no longer an option. As he put it, “we need to revisit what we’re doing.” While 
acknowledging that China’s force modernization and the impact of a crisis with China 
should be of concern, these considerations are not yet on Seoul’s radar.  
 
North Korea remains Seoul’s main concern. Pyongyang is determined to hold on 
to its nuclear weapons and keep upgrading its arsenal. Our speaker explained that there 
are questions as to whether Washington will be able and willing to carry out its defense 
commitment as US territory is increasingly going to fall within range of North Korean 
missiles, a problem embodied in the concept of “de-coupling.”  Even if the administration 
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is willing to honor its commitment, it may not be able to do so because the US Congress 
may deny action. Another concern is that Pyongyang may see its nuclear arsenal as 
providing cover to use conventional forces or cyber weapons for offensive attacks; this is 
known in the arm control lexicon as the stability-instability paradox. 
 
Our Korean speaker argued that deterrence by punishment was no longer an 
option. As he put it, “why wait to be hit if you know an attack is coming?” More 
appropriate is to focus on deterrence by early detection” identifying (and then removing) 
potential threats before they can do damage. He also suggested revisiting the 
reintroduction of US tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea, which would bolster 
deterrence of North Korea. Moreover, this would reassure Koreans, who trust, in 
principle, US defense commitments vis-a-vis South Korea, but worry about the reduction 
of numbers and roles of nuclear weapons in US national security policy. Ballistic missile 
defense systems may have a role to play in enhancing deterrence, but their technical 
feasibility is unclear and Seoul is worried about China's reaction to their development and 
deployment. Still, Seoul is “cautiously favorable” to missile defense systems and even 
favors cooperation with Japan on such systems, despite the existence of important 
emotional reservations associated with any type of cooperation with Japan. 
 
Our Japanese speaker explained that Tokyo’s position on these issues is laid out 
in the 2010 Defense Guidelines, which will be updated at the end of the year. 
Consistency should be expected. To Japan, the main challenge is “gray zones,” security 
threats that fall below the extended deterrence threshold, be it in a contingency with 
China (over the Senkaku Islands) or with North Korea. In this context, our speaker 
concurred with his Korean counterpart and argued for the need to focus on deterrence by 
early detection. 
 
When the Japanese doctrine of “Dynamic Deterrence” was coined in 2010 the 
main worry was Chinese 'creeping expansionism' in the East China Sea. That prompted 
Japan to focus on developing Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) 
capabilities. Since then, however, Tokyo has come to realize that ISR capabilities may be 
necessary but they are not sufficient to respond to Chinese and North Korean actions. 
Kinetic deterrence has become increasingly important: deterrence by early detection must 
be supported by deterrence by punishment. 
 
Our Japanese speaker explained that Tokyo has no doubt that US extended 
deterrence is strong.  In view of the US defense budget, he characterized his position as 
“cautiously optimistic”: he is optimistic because the United States has enough weapons 
systems in the pipeline to provide adequate deterrence for the next 10 to 20 years, but 
remains cautious because of the F-35 delay. The long, convoluted debate over whether 
the United States should strike Syria over its alleged use of chemical weapons also sends 
the wrong message to Japan and other US allies. As our speaker put it, “the United States 
needs to be clear about what it says and what it does.” More generally, our speaker 
stressed that nuclear weapons still have a role to play: they cast an important shadow that 
helps de-escalate conflict. Plainly, these weapons continue to be essential components of 
extended deterrence. In Japanese eyes, it is also fundamental that Washington not 
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acknowledge mutual nuclear vulnerability with China, which might tempt Beijing to 
think that its nuclear arsenal allows it to be more aggressive at the conventional level 
(again creating the stability-instability paradox). 
 
Our US speaker noted that the US rebalance to Asia, now two years old, is based 
on the belief that the US economy and the country’s future are inextricably linked to the 
region. While there is an ongoing debate about what the rebalance should look like, 
Washington remains determined to honor the defense commitments it has made to its 
allies and partners because their interests are, again, inextricably linked to its own 
interests. In the Asia Pacific, the United States is determined to preserve a balance of 
power that prevents the rise of a hegemon, prevents an attack on its homeland and on its 
allies and partners, preserves free trade and the freedom of navigation, prevents terrorism 
and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and favors democracy and human 
rights.  
 
While acknowledging the challenges to US extended deterrence posed by the 
prospect of a contingency with North Korea or China, our speaker stressed that North 
Korea cannot decouple the United States from its allies because Washington does not 
distinguish between deterrence and extended deterrence. Allies should learn from the 
Cold War, when Washington did not abandon its commitments to allies, even though the 
Soviet Union was much more powerful than North Korea. Moreover, the US has no 
intention to acknowledge mutual nuclear vulnerability with China; it may be a “fact of 
life,” but it is also true that this is “unequal vulnerability,” in which  the United States is 
much more powerful than China. 
 
While Washington does not think of North Korea and China in the same manner, 
our US speaker stressed that the two countries represent two sides of the same coin in that 
they present problems and demand increased trilateral cooperation among Washington, 
Seoul, and Tokyo. Unfortunately, there is little political urgency to strengthen such 
cooperation, mainly because of the bad shape of ROK-Japan relations. 
 
Our US speaker explained that extended deterrence is at work at all levels of 
escalation. As always, Washington prefers ambiguity regarding the particular conditions 
at which it will respond to maintain flexibility and ensure that neither adversaries nor 
allies are emboldened. Moreover, nuclear weapons are not the only means to provide 
extended deterrence: conventional weapons as well as ballistic missile defense systems 
have assumed a greater share of the deterrence burden. Conventional forces, in particular, 
lend themselves well to use in coordination with allies and ballistic missile defense 
systems can help reduce ‘de-coupling’ pressures. Looking to the future, it will be 
important to stop segregating extended deterrence policy with, on the one hand, nuclear 
weapons and, on the other, conventional weapons and ballistic missile defense systems. 
The US phased approach on ballistic missile defense systems builds the foundations to 




During discussion, participants focused mainly on the Syrian debate. Both 
Koreans and Japanese stressed that US credibility is at stake in this debate: several 
speakers emphasized that “red lines should not be drawn unless you intend to enforce 
them.” Failure to do so – for whatever reason -- damages US credibility among allies and 
adversaries. In Korean and Japanese eyes, the difficulties that the Obama administration 
faced winning domestic support for the use of force against Syria prompts concerns about 
the US ability to react quickly to a contingency in Northeast Asia. Americans countered 
by pointing out that there is more at stake than US credibility in the Syrian debate and 
that striking Damascus only for credibility reasons would be a mistake. They urged all 
parties to resist the tendency to see every challenge that the United States faces as a test 
of US credibility and commitment to its allies. Indeed, additional research is needed to 
better understand when and under what conditions such challenges truly threaten US 
credibility. Several participants underscored that a change in US policy after an 
improvement in a potential adversary’s capability would be seen as highly damaging to 
US credibility.  
 
Koreans and Japanese appeared unconvinced, however. As one Japanese 
participant put it, “while the US rebalance to Asia is the order of the day, sooner or later 
the United States will rebalance to other regions so, to us, it is a credibility issue.” The 
same participant went on to argue that the row over the Senkaku Islands, similarly, is a 
credibility test for the United States and the US-Japan alliance. Failure to address it 
appropriately would guarantee failure in the emerging territorial conflicts in the South 
China Sea. 
 
US budget constraints pose particular problems here, with challenges focusing not 
on deployments but force readiness. (In a marked shift from past discussions, Koreans 
and Japanese seem to regard US force readiness as more important than “numbers.”) 
Americans responded that budget pressures would have only a symbolic impact on force 
readiness: US military capabilities will remain second-to-none and more than sufficient 
to prevail in any given situation. Here and in subsequent discussions about the ROK 
desire to see the reintroduction of tactical nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula, 
there surfaced a tendency in the ROK to attribute the peace in Europe during the Cold 
War to the presence of US tactical nuclear weapons. This is misleading: the US forward 
deployed conventional presence in Europe should be credited, not tactical nuclear 
weapons. This argument found echo in a Japanese recommendation that the three 
countries should harden their military bases as well as make them more resilient and 
interoperable. 
 
Japan's interest in enhancing its collective self-defense role triggered considerable 
controversy. While seen as a positive development by Americans, it was met with 
skepticism and concern by Koreans, who insisted that Japan “needs to clarify its past.” 
This triggered scrutiny of the Japanese debate about the development of offensive 
conventional strike capabilities. Japanese participants explained that the issue was only 
“on the table” and that no conclusion had been reached. They stressed that the debate 
emerged in response to the growing ballistic missile threat that Japan faces. At any rate, 
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Japanese participants insisted that these forces would only be used in retaliation and that 
Tokyo would deal with the first attack against its territory with missile defense systems. 
 
Views of China and the Balance of Power in the Asia Pacific 
 
Our US speaker kicked off this session by stressing the continuity in US policy 
toward China across several administrations. He characterized US policy toward China as 
one that “engages and shakes Beijing.” Activism is the norm, which is consistent with US 
policy to “extend hands” to potential rivals, such as Iran, in an attempt to gauge and 
engage. This approach is used at the bilateral level, as well as at multilateral 
organizations. 
 
The rebalance is central to this approach. It does not constitute a pivot away from 
other regions, but, rather, is merely a refocus on the most dynamic region of the world, 
and it proceeds apace, with greater specificity in recent months. Discussions are now 
focused on how cooperation can and should work, and the specific capabilities needed.  
 
Our US speaker acknowledged that there is increased skepticism about China in 
the United States and its allies. The development of Chinese anti-access and anti-denial 
capabilities, in particular, is of concern; in response, the US has had a more focused 
debate, one that crystallized with the AirSea Battle concept. Still, today's problems are 
the same as those of the Cold War: de-coupling pressures and stability-instability 
paradox. The key question for the US today is how to reassure allies so that they don’t 
make the same decision as the French in the 1960s, i.e., develop independent nuclear 
weapon capabilities. 
 
Our Korean speaker stressed that the impact of China's rise on the regional 
balance of power is undeniable. Beijing's assertive and sometimes aggressive stances in 
the East and South China Seas are changing the security environment and, since the 
announcement of the US rebalance to the Asia Pacific, relations between the United 
States and China have become more heated. While most regional countries have 
welcomed the rebalance, they continue to seek to strengthen economic ties with China. 
 
Our speaker explained that China's force modernization efforts will be critical in 
structuring the balance of power in Asia. In the short- to medium-term, however, the 
United States will maintain military superiority over China. The ROK is determined to 
maintain its security relationship with the United States but is equally interested in 
forging strong ties with China. In this spirit, our speaker pointed out that if Seoul were to 
decide to participate in the US-led missile defense system program, this would likely fuel 
Beijing force modernization efforts, leading to an arms race in Northeast Asia. 
 
Our Japanese speaker assessed China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 
modernization efforts. The PLA is modernizing its submarine force and developing 
fourth-generation fighters as well as stealth technologies. The Second Artillery, the 
branch of the PLA that controls nuclear ballistic and conventional missiles, is developing 
short-range ballistic missiles, anti-ship ballistic missiles (DF-21D), medium-range 
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ballistic missiles (DF-21), as well as tactical cruise missiles. Moreover, China is 
expanding its space intelligence capabilities and should have six navigation satellites 
operational in 2020.  
 
How can escalation control be maintained in such a changing security 
environment? Our Japanese speaker argued that ISR capabilities are no longer sufficient 
for Japan. Something more is needed and he argued that Japan should upgrade its own 
air-sea capabilities to deal with “gray zone” situations and low- to medium-intensity 
conflicts, and US-Japan defense cooperation on high-end operations under anti-
access/area-denial environment should be enhanced. To support extended deterrence, the 
United States should maintain its ability to project force despite China’s anti-access and 
area-denial capabilities. In-theater power projection, in particular, will also become 
critical and a forward-deployed US presence will continue to be a key feature of extended 
deterrence in Northeast Asia. 
 
Our Japanese speaker also expressed concerns about arms races. He suggested 
that United States pursuit of the AirSea Battle concept could prompt China to drop its no-
first-use policy. In this regard, he was worried about the omission of the no-first-use 
pledge in China’s most recent White Paper. 
 
The discussion began with a focus on the value of trilateral dialogues in Northeast 
Asia. Korean participants explained that China has been pushing hard to establish the US-
ROK-China trilateral dialogue because of growing concern about cooperation among the 
United States, the ROK, and Japan. Many participants, however, countered that trilateral 
dialogues need not be mutually exclusive. In the absence of effective mechanisms to 
address the North Korea problem (the Six-Party Talks have not met since 2009), trilateral 
discussions can be useful for crisis management and contingency planning to deal with 
Pyongyang. The US-ROK-China dialogue was established with North Korea in mind. 
Trilateral discussions among the United States, the ROK, and Japan are meant to focus on 
North Korea, but they are broader in scope: they are also designed to enhance ROK-
Japan defense cooperation, which is weak.  
 
Discussing China in trilateral discussions between the United States, the ROK, 
and Japan is difficult because all three countries have different perceptions of and 
relations with Beijing. Koreans are the most reluctant of the three to identify China as a 
potential threat. They remain clear-eyed about the challenges posed by China's growing 
strength, however. They acknowledged that some foreign policy decisions (including 
those related to missile defense) reflect concern about Korean vulnerability to Chinese 
pressure. In response, Japanese participants suggested that Beijing would likely act as it 
did in the late 1990s and early 2000s when the issue came up for Japan, i.e., in their own 
words, “make a big deal out of it until the decision is made, then accept it as a fact of 
life.” 
 
The discussion moved on to Xi Jinping's willingness to develop a “new type of 
major country relations,” his recent meeting with President Obama in California, and 
implications for the regional balance of power. At the core of this discussion is Beijing's 
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intentions. There are three related questions: First, does China seek hegemony? If not, is 
it because of domestic concerns which will absorb the regime’s attention? Or, will 
domestic pressures mean that the regime cannot be seen to lose a fight? It is impossible to 
know, which makes it even more important to focus threat assessments on China's 
capabilities. At this point, Beijing's notorious lack of transparency on its military 
capabilities and force modernization plans becomes problematic. Also critical is ensuring 
that China is deeply integrated into the fabric of the international system, which in theory 
will make it conflict averse. 
 
Views of North Korea 
 
Our Korean speaker explained that the Park government is determined to develop 
a healthy inter-Korean relationship and advance a trust process based on “strong 
deterrence.” Seoul is also focused on “rule implementation,” as opposed to rule making. 
In other words, for Koreans, violators should be held accountable if something goes 
wrong. Seoul still believes that dialogue with Pyongyang should be resumed, and it 
remains cautiously positive about its potential. Given the traditional cycle of 
“provocation-engagement-provocation” with Pyongyang, only a cautious approach is 
viable. As he put it, “we want to make sure that we see strategic change in North Korea, 
not a tactical shift.” 
 
Dealing with North Korea remains a multidimensional problem, one of which is 
nuclear. Others include human rights, proliferation, smuggling, and counterfeiting. For 
Seoul, the road to Pyongyang runs through Beijing and there is the belief that a ROK-
China-US approach could bear fruit. At the same time, it is important to prepare for a 
North Korea contingency and for this, US-ROK-Japan cooperation is crucial. 
 
Our Japanese speaker stressed that North Korea has no intention to give up its 
nuclear arsenal, particularly now that Pyongyang has amended its constitution, indicating 
that it is a nuclear-armed state. While deterrence of North Korea has worked over the 
years (because there has been no large-scale war on the Peninsula since 1953), 
responding to Pyongyang’s provocations is increasingly difficult. 
 
Our speaker pointed out that Japan, unlike the United States and the ROK, does 
not have a good deterrence policy vis-à-vis North Korea and that Tokyo’s only option is 
to strengthen sanctions against Pyongyang if deterrence fails. Japan is addressing this 
problem, however, by strengthening its ISR and ballistic missile defense systems. Tokyo 
also believes that joint trilateral US-Japan-ROK exercises would enhance deterrence of 
Pyongyang. Given strained Japan-ROK relations, however, managing media exposure of 
such exercises will be critical. 
 
Our US speaker dismissed the idea that restarted Six-Party Talks would yield 
results because participants are a “coalition of divided.”  There is no coordination of 
strategic interests among members. The United States sees North Korea as a threat to 
South Korea and regional peace, and it also sees it as a nuclear threat, a proliferation 
threat, and a credibility threat. South Korea is interested in preventing military 
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provocations from the North and in promoting reunification. Given the differences, it is 
critical to maintain strong communication among allies, constantly explain what relevant 
interests and concerns are, and how they align or diverge. This is more easily said than 
done given the many actors involved: leaders, policymakers, and publics all shape 
policymaking. 
 
Our speaker pointed out that the United States is developing a comprehensive 
defense strategy, which includes both political and monetary investments, to deter, detect, 
defend against, disrupt, and, if necessary, destroy North Korean threats. While 
recognizing that ROK-Japan relations are difficult, Washington expects the ROK and 
Japan to cooperate and welcomes joint exercises to prepare for a scenario in which 
deterrence of North Korea fails. In short, the United States expects a coordinated allied 
response to a North Korean contingency and, upstream, coordinated diplomacy to deal 
with Pyongyang. 
 
During the discussion, Korean participants highlighted that the Park 
administration's approach to North Korea has two tracks: development of a trust process 
and strong deterrence. It does not, as a consequence, constitute a return to the Sunshine 
Policy. Korean participants conceded that the reintroduction of US tactical nuclear 
weapons on the Korean Peninsula has costs, but there are benefits as well. As one 
participant put it, “if North Korea continues to expand its capabilities, the impression is 
that we would need to do “something physical.” 
 
Japanese participants, for their part, explained that North Korea's nuclear and 
missile developments are of utmost concern to Tokyo. Particularly worrisome are No 
Dong missiles, which cannot be easily detected. Japan’s Ministry of Defense received a 
report after the December 2012 North Korean missile launch stressing that Pyongyang's 
missile developments have entered a new phase. More generally, Japanese believe that as 
long as China wants to keep the regime alive, North Korea will not change. 
 
From a US perspective, North Korea is a serious threat because it has weapons of 
mass destruction, it can use them, it can proliferate them, and it will increasingly be able 
to decouple the United States from its allies. North Korea, however, will not be able to 
continue to press on with its nuclear and missile developments and achieve economic 
prosperity because the United States (and others) will not allow it. Americans also 
insisted that it was paramount for US allies to take up a greater share of the deterrence 
burden vis-a-vis North Korea and ensure that their capabilities are properly integrated. 
(Americans reiterated that Washington sees reintroduction of US tactical nuclear 
weapons on the Korean Peninsula as a counterproductive development.) At the policy 
level, it is essential that the United States, the ROK, and Japan coordinate their message 
to North Korea. Significantly, this coordination does not mean that the three countries 
must send the same message. Rather, it means that messaging needs to be coordinated, 
i.e., shared in advance among the three countries before being issued and contradictory 




Changes in National Defense Postures and Status of Reforms 
 
Our Japanese speaker explained that the return to power of the Liberal 
Democratic Party and the fact that the Diet is no longer “twisted” (with a different party 
controlling each chamber) should bring stability to Japanese politics, at least until 2016. 
This will allow Tokyo to address foreign policy goals that could not be previously 
tackled.  
 
Since taking office at the end of 2013, Prime Minister Abe has visited over 20 
countries and used Japan’s alliance with the United States as a bridge to enhance 
cooperation with third parties. In so doing, Japan pursues its version of “favorable 
strategic balancer” and “favorable balance of relations” to optimize its strategic position 
in the Asia Pacific. Moreover, despite problematic statements about history, Abe has 
been relatively cautious in presenting his foreign policy agenda to the region and the 
world. 
 
By December, a national security council will be established, a milestone in 
Japan’s foreign policy, providing guidance and enhancing interagency coordination. 
Whether Japan can exercise its right of collective self-defense in view of restrictions 
included in Article 9 of its constitution remains unclear. However, our speaker suggested 
that Abe will likely revise some security-related laws to be able to conduct collective 
self-defense operations. The key objective will be to increase Japan’s indigenous 
capabilities, even though numerous questions remain as to how this should be done. 
Upgrading Japan’s defense posture will be critical and there are a number of issues to be 
addressed so that this can be done in a manner that enhances the US-Japan alliance. 
Finally, Japan will continue to build regional capacity to deal with humanitarian 
assistance and disaster relief as well as maritime security issues and Tokyo will 
increasingly aim for “collective balancing” vis-à-vis China. 
 
While recognizing that the US rebalance to Asia should have been more 
thoroughly defined before being advertised, our US speaker explained that it remains a 
meaningful concept that helps the United States allocate its resources. In other words, 
while its implementation is yet to be made “visible” to Asia, it is shaping US policy 
planning. 
 
Our speaker pointed out that strengthening coordination, cooperation, and 
integration among allies at the bilateral, trilateral, and quadrilateral levels is central to the 
rebalance. A key part of this effort is engagement at the operational level, namely through 
exercises, but also in other areas, such as AirSea Battle. Thus, the United States continues 
to view nuclear weapons as critical to US national security and extended deterrence 
policy, but it also assesses that it can safely proceed with nuclear reductions. More 
understanding of the non-nuclear elements of extended deterrence is needed, as well as 
how deterrence strategies can be better tailored to specific situations. 
 
Our Korean speaker explained the basics of the ROK’s 2012 defense posture and 
the recent revision of its missile guidelines, which were conducted in partnership with the 
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United States. He explained that the ROK’s ballistic missile defense systems are tailored 
to its security environment: they are meant to intercept low-altitude missiles. While there 
is growing support for the reintroduction of tactical nuclear weapons on the Korean 
Peninsula, our speaker argued that most people are opposed to the idea. He reckoned that 
the debate about reintroduction is proof that the US must do more to reassure Seoul.  
Japan’s development of offensive strike capabilities raises similar challenges: in 
principle, the ROK government understands Japan’s rationale for development, but 
remains both suspicious and concerned. Japanese intentions are key. The ROK would like 
Japan to provide a clear strategic plan about the way such capabilities would be used. 
Still, our speaker argued that the current security environment lends itself well to greater 
trilateral coordination among the United States, the ROK, and Japan. Making such efforts 
work will be tough given difficult ROK-Japan relations. 
 
During the discussion, Korean participants reiterated that the revision of missile 
guidelines is a direct response to North Korea's nuclear and missile developments. 
Japanese participants stressed that they understood the need for the ROK to do so but 
questioned whether developing ballistic missiles was the best response. Korean 
participants in turn responded that cruise missiles have already been deployed and can 
reach North Korean caves and hidden targets, but ballistic missiles are also essential to 
reach targets behind North Korean mountains. Japanese participants also complained that 
the revision of missile guidelines was conducted with little transparency vis-a-vis Japan; 
this is part of a more general Japanese grievance about transparency in the US-ROK 
alliance: transparency is sorely lacking from Tokyo’s perspective. This concern was 
made plain in Japanese comments about working out the OpCon transfer.  
 
Korean participants voiced eerily similar complaints about Japanese efforts to 
loosen restrictions on the exercise of its right to join collective self-defense. They focused 
on Japan's possible acquisition of strike capabilities, asserting that the ROK constitution 
defines the entire Korean Peninsula as ROK territory; thus a Japanese strike against 
North Korea would be a strike against the ROK. While this is a legal fiction, this 
demonstrates the sensitivities surrounding Japanese interests in offensive capabilities. 
These two examples underscore a fundamental problem in the Japan-ROK relationship 
that has profound implications for the US: each country sees its own actions as 
contributing to regional security yet labels the other’s as potentially destabilizing. 
Transparency and trust are in short supply.  
 
Reassurance and Extended Deterrence 
 
Our US speaker opened up this session by pointing out that extended deterrence 
has worked well in Northeast Asia thanks to credible threats to potential enemies and 
credible reassurance to allies. Reassurance is created by a variety of means: formal treaty 
commitments, reinforced diplomacy, official statements, superior conventional military 
forces in the region, power projection, joint exercises and other forms of defense 




When discussing extended deterrence in Northeast Asia, there are two (very 
different) reference points: China and North Korea. With regard to China, our speaker 
stressed that the United States does not view China as an adversary but, rather, as a 
competitor. This contrasts with the Japanese perspective, which views China more as an 
adversary. That is not to say that the United States doesn’t have important concerns about 
China. The US worries about conventional and nuclear force modernization, lack of 
transparency, development of anti-area/access capabilities, challenge to freedom of 
navigation in the South and East China Seas, and Beijing’s blase approach to 
proliferation. The United States must walk a fine line: it must ensure that regional allies 
are reassured yet must do so in a a way that does not provoke China.  
 
Turning to the Japan-China row over the Senkaku Islands, our speaker reiterated 
US policy: while the US makes no judgment about ownership of the islands (or any other 
territorial dispute to which it is not a party), the US nevertheless maintains that they are 
covered by Article V of the US-Japan Security Treaty, which calls for the United States 
to defend Japan in the event of conflict over territories under Japan's administration 
(which includes the Senkakus). Washington would be reluctant to be drawn into a 
confrontation with China, especially over territory that many consider “strategically 
insignificant.” So while the US will assist Japan to defend the islands, it encourages 
Japan and China to resolve the issue peacefully.  
 
Our US speaker argued that deterrence of major North Korean aggression is 
working, if only because there has not been a war on the Peninsula since 1953. At lower 
levels of provocation and violence, however, extended deterrence has not always worked. 
While things appear to have calmed down, the multiple provocations that took place in 
the spring are evidence that North Korea may feel emboldened by its growing nuclear 
weapon and missile capabilities, and a new cycle of provocations could resume. 
 
In these circumstances, a number of questions arise. One refers to the extended 
deterrence threshold, i.e. when it should kick in, and whether the United States, the ROK, 
and Japan agree on this. For attacks “under the wire or for “gray zone” provocations, the 
issue is how to address these threats and who should do it. The United States? The allies 
themselves? Both? With what capabilities? (Current debate in Japan about conventional 
strike options should be viewed in this light.) Another question is linked to the 
implications for extended deterrence as the United States becomes increasingly 
vulnerable to China's and North Korea's arsenals. How can there be tighter coupling 
between the United States and its allies without antagonizing China and creating an arms 
race? Our speaker rebuffed the ROK call for redeployment of US tactical nuclear 
weapons on the Peninsula, arguing that it is unnecessary since the United States can use 
nuclear weapons from CONUS, in the remote case that they are needed, it runs counter to 
the broader US goal to reduce the roles and numbers of nuclear weapons in US national 
security policy, and it could bolster Pyongyang's claim that it needs its nuclear arsenal. At 
the same time, however, there are questions about the impact of US nuclear reductions on 
extended deterrence:  in particular, at what point does the nuclear umbrella become 'too 
thin' to be credible? 
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Our Japanese speaker stressed that Tokyo is concerned that the United States 
could openly acknowledge mutual vulnerability with China. Although many experts 
concede that mutual vulnerability between the United States and China is a fact, such 
vulnerability is unequal. In Japanese eyes, the United States continues to have a clear 
edge over China; the task of reassurance would be considerably more difficult if 
Washington acknowledged mutual vulnerability. China’s  lack of transparency about its 
military activities is another reason why Japanese urge the US to not change its stance. 
 
Our Japanese speaker argued that Pyongyang's nuclear and conventional 
capabilities are progressing and there is concern that these developments will de-couple 
Japan and the United States. He explained that strong coupling is essential and that 
Washington must make sure it acts appropriately vis-a-vis North Korea. A failure to do 
so would undercut Japanese perception of US credibility and might lead Japanese to 
anticipate a similar failure in the event of a contingency with China.  
 
To counter this fear, our speaker argued for a much more visible deterrence 
posture on the part of the United States and its allies. US-ROK military exercises, B52 
deployment, the revision of US-ROK missile guidelines are all positive developments. 
Japan is equally determined to be active, as exemplified by promulgation of new National 
Defense Program Guidelines, the revision of collective self defense limts, the creation of 
a National Security Council, the creation of a National Security Strategy, and the possible 
deployment of offensive strike capabilities. Debate about these capabilities, our speaker 
stressed, does not come from concerns about the credibility of US extended deterrence. 
Rather, they are meant to enhance Japan's security and contribute to strengthening 
extended deterrence when North Korea could become overconfident about its growing 
arsenal. 
 
Our Korean speaker began by explaining that successful deterrence is not 
necessarily the same as successful assurance. In other words, the United States may deter 
North Korea while failing to reassure the ROK. Successful assurance of the ROK 
requires that Seoul resist intimidation from North Korea and refrain from seeking 
independent nuclear weapon capabilities.  
 
Today's strategic landscape is different from that of the Cold War. While 
deterrence worked then, it might not today since North Korea may see an advantage in 
using nuclear weapons. That is why more reassurance of the ROK is needed. In the 
context of US policy favoring the reductions of the roles and numbers of nuclear 
weapons, our speaker explained that Seoul is unlikely to be reassured, even less so as the 
United States is making significant cuts to its defense budget. While the redeployment of 
US tactical nuclear weapons on the Peninsula may not add significant deterrence value 
vis-a-vis Pyongyang, its psychological value for the ROK should not be underestimated. 
 
During the discussion, Koreans and Japanese stressed the essential role of US 
nuclear weapons for extended deterrence and assurance missions. Significantly, some 
Korean participants expressed concerns over the US policy to reduce the roles and 
numbers of nuclear weapons in its national security policy. One Korean warned that 
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Washington should not emphasize the benefits of conventional deterrence over nuclear 
deterrence, as this might undermine both extended deterrence and reassurance. 
Americans responded that the conventional and nuclear components of extended 
deterrence are mutually reinforcing, not mutually exclusive.  
 
More generally, both Koreans and Japanese view extended deterrence and 
assurance as inextricably linked to their broader relationship with the United States. In 
other words, extended deterrence and assurance will be strong if the ROK and Japan are, 
and feel that they are, in sync with the United States. As one Korean put it, “sometimes 
our perception of our strategic value to the US matters most to us.” However, a recurrent 
theme of the discussion was the need for a more visible type of extended deterrence and 
assurance. Both the ROK and Japan regard the B2/52 deployment in the Spring of 2013 
as positive. More work needs to be done to ascertain how extended deterrence and 
assurance can be made more visible. 
 
Opportunities for Trilateral Relations that Increase Extended Deterrence 
  
Our Korean speaker began by stressing Korean and Japanese concerns about 
extended deterrence. Blame North Korea's nuclear and missile development, President 
Obama's vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and its commitment to reduce the 
roles and numbers of nuclear weapons in US national security policy and China (even 
though Japanese and Korean perceptions of the Chinese threat are not identical). 
Common concerns provide many potential areas of cooperation for the three allies. They 
can conduct regular joint military exercises at nearby high seas with the participation of 
US aircraft carriers or submarines. Occasional fly-overs of the Korean Peninsula or the 
Japanese islands by US strategic bombers are another option. US airplanes based in either 
the ROK or Japan could be rotated to train for a rapid response to a North Korean 
contingency. Improving interoperability and networking among the three armed forces to 
enhance C4ISR capabilities would also be helpful. The three allies could develop joint 
missile defense capabilities, as has been done by the United States and Japan. (Our 
speaker conceded that the ROK government has been hesitant to join such efforts.) 
Finally, an organization or a more institutionalized forum among the three countries 
could be established to better plan, consult, exercise, and cooperate on extended 
deterrence issues. Of course, the United States could also decide to reintroduce tactical 
nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula. 
 
Cooperation won’t be easy, however. All three countries face budgetary 
constraints. Poisonous ROK-Japan relations, exemplified by the failure to sign a General 
Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) and an Acquisition and Cross-
Servicing Agreement (ACSA) last year, are another obstacle. Prime Minister Shinzo 
Abe's recent statements on history and territorial issues have fueled mistrust in Korea; in 
this atmosphere the willingness of his Cabinet to normalize the roles and missions of 
Japanese armed forces only raises the bar to bilateral cooperation between Seoul and 
Tokyo. Finally, there are Korean concerns about China's reaction to any heightened 
cooperation. According to our speaker, the development of trilateral cooperation on 
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missile defense would be particularly problematic for Beijing, which is why Seoul has 
resisted it so far. 
 
Our Japanese speaker stressed that it was essential for Japanese and Korean 
military forces to practice together because large-scale military operations cannot be 
sustained in the region without Japan-ROK cooperation. Cooperation is needed in time of 
contingency, but also in peacetime, be it on missile defense, information sharing, military 
exercises, counterproliferation, or counter piracy. Given political sensitivities to enhanced 
bilateral cooperation, an incremental approach should be adopted. Conclusion of a 
GSOMIA is a critical first step to strengthen cooperation and, in Japanese eyes, this 
would not antagonize China. 
 
Our US speaker stressed that the United States is interested in operationalizing 
and institutionalizing US-ROK-Japan trilateral partnership not only to deter North Korea, 
but also to shape its political evolution and enhance regional stability. Focusing on North 
Korea is important because this is where the interests of the United States, the ROK, and 
Japan most closely align. It is also urgent because Pyongyang is pressing ahead with 
nuclear and missile developments and the associated challenges will only grow. In these 
circumstances, as he put it, trilateral cooperation is not “a nice thing to do but a must do.”  
 
Our speaker acknowledged the hurdles identified by other speakers: history and 
political issues, practical impediments, such as the lack of a GSOMIA and ACSA, and 
strained resources.  He urged the three countries to conduct joint exercises, not merely 
exchange observers, in areas like missile defense, counterproliferation, and maritime 
security, all of which require an ACSA. Given budget constraints, the ROK and Japan 
should consider joint acquisition of ISR assets such as Global Hawk, which, again, 
cannot occur without a bilateral GSOMIA to protect sensitive information. In addition, 
senior-leader visits are critical and should be strengthened, and policy statements on 
extended deterrence and assurance should be coordinated. 
 
Our speaker also addressed what the United States should strive not to do. 
Avoiding being dragged into bilateral political disputes is by far the most important goal. 
Washington is equally determined not to let either Northeast Asian ally hijack the policy 
agenda: Washington will not be dragged into an ROK-Japan competition for US 
influence at the expense of the other.  The US will also endeavor to ensure that trilateral 
cooperation is not construed as part of a strategy to contain China. At the same time, 
however, the US will push for trilateral cooperation, which can be enhanced without 
antagonizing Beijing. 
 
During the discussion, participants concurred that ROK and Japanese security 
communities would benefit from deeper coordination and cooperation. Acknowledging 
that publics shape policy and could derail such cooperation, participants were divided on 
whether this process should receive high-level attention or develop behind the scenes, 
i.e., at the operational level. All agree, however, that high-level support is essential if 
greater cooperation is to proceed; the question is whether to highlight lower-level 
successes. Thus, it was recommended that a campaign to raise public awareness about the 
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benefits of enhancing ROK-Japan defense cooperation would help narrow the gap 
between security communities and publics. 
 
General Observations, Concluding Remarks, and Next Steps 
 
This trilateral extended deterrence dialogue, the first held by the Pacific Forum 
CSIS, was immensely helpful in laying out US, ROK, and Japanese positions on 
extended deterrence and assurance. It also provided a forum where the three countries can 
better appreciate, build upon, and develop shared interests on these issues, as well as 
coordinate policy. While all participants conceded that they began the discussions with 
some trepidation -- given the state of relations between Tokyo and Seoul -- Americans, 
South Koreans, and Japanese participants readily acknowledged the value of this 
dialogue. The Japanese, in particular, saw it as critical in helping promote understanding 
of Japan's positions in the ROK. With the right people, the right agenda, and the right 
chair, this process can produce positive results. Many participants suggested that the next 
iteration of this dialogue include a tabletop exercise, which has the potential of 
considerably enhancing track-2 and track-1 dialogue efforts. 
 
Hanging over the meeting were tensions in the ROK-Japan relationship, which 
inhibit greater trilateral coordination and cooperation, even when it is seen as 
contributing to both sides' national security. However, a key takeaway is that this 
problem can be sidestepped if progress at the trilateral level is conceptualized as an effort 
to enhance coordination between the US-ROK alliance and the US-Japan alliance, as 
opposed to an attempt to coordinate policies among the three countries more generally. In 
future iterations of this dialogue, more thought should be given to what this implies and 
how this can be done. 
 
Finally, discussions on ways to strengthen the Northeast Asian regional security 
architecture brought home the point that developments in one region may impact on 
another. A few participants suggested that efforts by Seoul and Tokyo to develop 
expanded missile capabilities may influence Russian thinking and impact negatively on 
the debate over the consolidation of US and Russian tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. 
It is increasingly clear that cross-regional extended deterrence issues should be given 
more attention. (Recall that the US-Russian Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, 
which was concluded in 1987 almost exclusively with the European theater in mind, 
raised concerns in Japan as a result of the possible redeployment of Russian systems to 
the Far East.) This also makes a strong case for the conduct of a separate effort to discuss 
(and perhaps coordinate) extended deterrence issues among, for instance, US participants 
and Northeast Asian and America’s European allies. This would help US allies better 
understand how extended deterrence is conducted in different regions and nudge them 
toward better policy coordination and cooperation. This would be an immensely useful 
exercise for US Northeast Asian allies in particular, which appear to be increasingly 
looking to the “European model” of extended deterrence (exercised through the North 
































US-ROK-JAPAN EXTENDED DETERRENCE TRILATERAL 
September 2-3, 2013 




Monday, September 2 
 
9:00AM  Introductions 
 
9:15AM Session I: Strategic Perspectives and Extended Deterrence  
 
The three countries compare and contrast perspectives on regional security threats and 
challenges, with special attention to the e role of US extended deterrence. What 
distinguishes these threats from other security challenges? What are the important trends 
or factors that influence the salience of these threats? What is the role of deterrence by 
denial and deterrence by punishment for addressing these threats and what role does the 
US nuclear arsenal play versus other non-nuclear assets like missile defense, 
conventional forces, etc.?  How should we apportion our range of resources to these 
specific challenges? How should we discuss or frame these challenges to ensure they get 
the attention they deserve without inflating them or provoking other countries?  
 
  Korea Presenter: CHOI Kang, The Asan Institute 
Japan Presenter: Sugio TAKAHASHI, MOD 
US Presenter: Shane SMITH, NDU 
 
10:45AM Coffee break 
 
11:00AM Session 2: Views of China and the balance of power in the Asia Pacific 
 
How does each country see the balance of power in Asia? Is it changing? If so, how and 
why (i.e, what is driving that shift)? What is the impact of that shift? How does a shift 
impact US extended deterrence commitments and the role of nuclear weapons? How does 
each country evaluate PLA military modernization efforts (e.g. nuclear forces, 
submarines, etc.)? 
 
  US Presenter: Eric THOMPSON, CNA 
  Korea Presenter: KIM Hankwon, The Asan Institute 










1:45PM Session 3: Views of North Korea  
 
How does each country characterize the North Korean threat? What is the role of 
deterrence? What specific scenarios is each country trying to deter and what are they 
doing? What does each government expect the other two to contribute to deterrence and 
what is expected when deterrence fails? At what level does North Korea become a threat 
that engages the US extended deterrent and at what point should the US nuclear arsenal 
come into play?  
 
  Korea Presenter: CHEON Seong-Whun, KINU 
  Japan Presenter: Hiroyasu AKUTSU, NIDS 
US Presenter: Kevin SHEPARD, USFK 
   
3:15PM Break 
 
3:30PM Session 4: Changes in national defense postures and status of reforms  
 
What is the status of defense postures and programs, especially given the new 
governments in Tokyo and Seoul? What is each government planning to do? How will 
those changes impact the extended deterrent? To what degree does the extended deterrent 
shape Japanese and ROK plans? What is the status of the rebalance and the Obama 
administration’s plans to try to continue to reduce nuclear weapons on the extended 
deterrent? How can these policies best be used to strengthen extended deterrence? 
   
  Japan Presenter: Ken JIMBO, Keio University 
US Presenter: Bryan PORT, USFK 




Tuesday, September 3 
 
9:00AM Session 5: Reassurance and extended deterrence 
 
How can the US reassure the ROK and Japan regarding the viability and credibility of its 
extended deterrent? What does each government want Washington to do? Is there 
anything in particular that would be troubling to these governments? What should the US 
NOT do? Are there nonmilitary ways the US can reassure its allies of the durability of its 
extended deterrent and its commitment to their defense?  
 
  US Presenter: Robert GROMOLL, US State Dept. 
  Japan Presenter: Sugio TAKAHASHI, NIDS 
  Korea Presenter: WOO Jung-Yeop, The Asan Institute 
 
10:30AM Coffee break 
A-3 
 
10:45AM Session 6: Opportunities for trilateral relations that increase extended 
deterrence 
 
What can the three governments do together to shore up extended deterrence in East 
Asia?  When can they cooperate in the region in a meaningful way? Can each 
government see ways that the other two countries can cooperate to increase extended 
deterrence? Are there things they should not do?  
 
  Korea Presenter: KIM Young-ho, KNDU 
Japan Presenter: Takehiro FUNAKOSHI, MOFA 
  US Presenter: Michael URENA, US State Dept. 
   
12:15PM Lunch 
 
1:30PM Session 7: Next steps 
 
What should the three countries do to strengthen regional stability and deterrence?  How 
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